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Effects of Scandals on Voter Turnout
in Canada
by Terrance Kutney

Although there has been much research done regarding the effects of political scandals on the
voting share won by a political party, little research has been done on the effect of political
scandals on voter turnout. This is especially true in the context of Canadian politics. This
work analyzes the effect of the Canadian sponsorship scandal on voter turnout, primarily
using the 2004 and 2006 iterations of the Canadian Election Study. It finds a positive relationship between anger about the sponsorship scandal and the probability of voting. Closer
analysis of the 2004 election shows that voters who were angry about the sponsorship scandal
increased their political activity leading up to the election and were thus more likely to vote.

Introduction

On 19 May 2013, Nigel Wright resigned his position as chief of staff to the Canadian Prime Minister, having been implicated in what is now known as the Canadian
Senate Expenses Scandal. The year before, the auditor general of Canada found that
Conservative Party Senator Mike Duffy had violated Senate expense claim rules, and
the prime minister’s office had intervened in an attempt to limit fallout. This entailed
cutting a deal with Senator Duffy, who was required to reimburse $90,000 in claimed
expenses. Further inflaming the public, news sources later revealed that Chief of Staff
Nigel Wright had cut Duffy a $90,000 check to cover expenses on the deal that Wright
helped to arrange. Critics alleged that Wright violated criminal law and was guilty of
bribery, fraud, and breach of trust. Certainly, the Wright-Duffy affair served to compound negative public perceptions of governmental corruption and further damage
trust in Parliament.
The Canadian Senate Expenses Scandal is only one of a string of scandals affecting Canadian politics. In Toronto, Mayor Rob Ford was captured on video smoking
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crack cocaine and stands accused of being an alcoholic who has driven while under
the influence. In 2004, in an episode known as the Sponsorship Scandal, broad corruption was uncovered in a federal government program in Quebec, which involved
millions of dollars that were awarded without a proper bidding process and sometimes without any work required. The sponsorship scandal is widely thought to have
resulted in the historic defeat of the Liberal Party of Canada in 2006, which was
replaced by a Conservative government for the first time since 1993. This election also
marked a reversal in an eighteen-year downward trend in election turnout. This information suggests that scandals, rather than marking the demise of democracy, might
actually invigorate democratic participation in Western countries, such as Canada, by
increasing election turnout.
This work examines the effect of political scandals on election turnout within a
Canadian context. To test this effect, this study presents a possible explanation for election turnout and applies the proposed explanation to data from two Canadian elections.
Specifically, it considers the theory that a political scandal galvanizes the voter base and
leads to greater turnout as voters attempt to replace wayward politicians. Thus, it is
hypothesized that the sponsorship scandal in 2004 increased voter turnout in subsequent Canadian elections by angering voters into political activity. This theory may
seem counterintuitive, as there is a strong tendency to believe that political scandals
will lead to a disappointed electorate that sees little point in voting. This article shows,
however, that the anger-response theory, as applied to Canada, provides a reasonable
explanation for increased election turnout. The elections examined here have been
largely ignored by academic studies and provide convincing support for this theory.
To examine the hypothesis that political scandal leads to greater election turnout, this work will analyze relevant literature, examine the theoretical basis of the
hypothesis presented, review the historical context of the Sponsorship Scandal, and
then discuss the methodology of the statistical tests performed. Through analyzing
relevant literature, it is apparent that experts on election turnout have not definitively
determined the causes of election turnout nor the effect of political scandals on election turnout. This section also provides a foundational understanding of the causal
relationship that exists between the sponsorship scandal and increased voter turnout
in subsequent elections. The section that outlines the historical background of the
sponsorship scandal provides a brief overview of the scandal and establishes valuable
context for the statistical tests performed. The methodology section explains three ways
in which the effects of the sponsorship scandal on election turnout are examined.
This work highlights general trends in Canadian election turnout, uses statistical tests to determine individual voting behavior in two Canadian elections,
and demonstrates through data analysis the causal relationship described in the
hypothesis. It concludes that the general trends in Canadian election turnout partially support the hypothesis that the sponsorship scandal increased election turnout. This finding is further substantiated by a test of individual voting behavior
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using election surveys from the 2004 and 2006 elections. A test of the causal relationship further supports the hypothesis that the sponsorship scandal mobilized voters
and increased voter turnout.

Literature Review

Prominent academics have long puzzled over why people choose to vote.
According to a rational choice model, the vast majority of people should decide not to
vote. This model suggests that a person should only vote when the expected benefit
of voting, which is a function of the probability that the vote cast will be decisive, is
greater than the cost of voting (generally viewed as the opportunity cost of spending
time and effort to become informed and then physically voting). Since the probability
of casting a decisive ballot is extremely low, the cost of voting will almost always be
greater than the expected benefit. However, people do vote and in large numbers
(Blais 2000: 2). In the 2012 U.S. election, less than 55 percent of eligible voters cast their
ballots, but this still meant that over 129 million people voted (Woolley and Peters
2013). To resolve this discrepancy, some academics have suggested the rational choice
model cannot fully explain voting behavior.
Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen offer an alternative theory based
on the concept of mobilization (1993). Central to this concept is the idea of social
networks—groups of friends, colleagues, politicians, and interest groups—that exert
pressure on individuals to vote. These social networks work through social pressure.
People want to be valued, and social networks fulfill that need. Politicians have an
incentive to use social networks to mobilize voters in “get out the vote” campaigns
(Blais 2000: 13). Various studies and field experiments have found that social pressure, including communication that encourages voting, can have a significant, positive impact on voter turnout (Mann 2010: 388; Amaro de Matos and Barros 2004: 239).
Interestingly, too much social pressure can also be a bad thing. Research suggests
that politicians who overuse social pressure experience backlash (Matland and Murray 2013). According to one study, a politician who uses social pressure may inadvertently increase voter anger and hostility toward him/herself. Such resentment
then increases the probability that people will vote against the candidate (Matland
and Murray 2013). This concept of mobilization offers a key insight into the possible
causal relationship, tying political scandals to increased election turnout.
Daniel Stockerner and Patricia Calca support this relationship by finding that
political scandals cause higher election turnout (2013: 535). Stockerner and Calca
argue that a political scandal operates as a mobilizing agent. That is, political scandals
anger the public and cause people to vote who would not usually engage in politics.
This theory posits that people vote because they hope to “throw out the bums.” This
causal logic seems reasonable when applied to a country like Canada, which does not
suffer from highly visible endemic corruption. Politicians in Canada are not expected
to be corrupt, so political scandals may be unexpected and shocking, thus angering
the public.
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Other explanations for election turnout include theories that focus on the phenomenon of voter fatigue. Margit Tavits argues that election turnout depends on
institutions. Tavits finds that having a direct election for a president has the effect of
fatiguing voters, which lowers voter turnout. In fact, she finds that having a direct
presidential election lowers voter turnout by 7 percent (2009: 42). In line with Tavits’
work, Richard Boyd suggests that increasing the frequency of elections also reduces
turnout. According to Boyd, countries with more frequent elections will experience
lower voter turnout, as frequent elections fatigue voters (1989: 730). Further expanding on the concept of voter fatigue, Christopher R. Berry and Jacob Gersen argue
that the timing of the election plays a crucial role. The authors found that municipal
elections that coincided with federal elections had substantially larger voter turnout.
Essentially, the authors explain low municipal election turnout using a variation of
voter fatigue; they argue that only the most fervent and dedicated voters will vote
in municipal elections not held in tandem with federal elections (Berry and Gersen
2010: 37).
Furthermore, Maciej A. Gorecki finds that more competitive elections have greater
voter turnout. Studying the multiple rounds of voting that take place during Polish
elections for city president, Gorecki found that the political elite increased the intensity
of their campaigning during competitive elections, which persuaded the public to vote
(2009: 291). Although many academics have focused on voter fatigue, some have also
explained voter turnout by drawing on more atypical causal relationships.
Many alternative explanations of voter turnout focus on less conventional
causes. Brad Gomez, Thomas Hansford, and George Krause argue that the small
things are what count. Through a study of U.S. presidential elections, the authors
found that rainy weather decreases election turnout by almost 1 percent per inch of
rain. The authors also found that snow can depress election turnout, although only
by about 0.5 percent per inch of snowfall (Gomez, Hansford, and Krause 2007: 649).
This finding is substantiated by Steve Knack, who also found that inclement weather
depressed election turnout (1994: 187). Additionally, Joseph Robbins, Lance Hunter,
and Gregg R. Murray look at the effect of terrorism on election turnout, finding that
terrorism is positively correlated with election turnout (2013: 495). Robins, Hunter,
and Murray acknowledge that their findings run counter to conventional wisdom.
Their analysis is substantiated, however, by the work of Valentina Bali, who found
that the Madrid train bombing effectively mobilized segments of Spanish society that
were otherwise less likely to participate in elections (2007: 669). Clearly, there are
many unconventional explanations of election turnout.
Little work has been done specifically examining the causes of election turnout
in Canada. Descriptions tend to center on the competitiveness of Canadian elections but some address other factors as well. Howard A. Scarrow offers a few explanations, suggesting that inclement weather and competitiveness both play a role
(1961: 351). James Endersby, Steven Galatas, and Chapman Rackaway also attribute
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Canadian election turnout to competitiveness, finding that the closeness of elections explained turnout in the 1993 and 1997 federal elections (2002). Furthermore,
Donley Studlar presents a pattern of Canadian voter turnout in which provincial
elections have greater turnout than federal elections. Studlar finds that region, population density, and the amount of time elapsed since the last provincial or federal
election have the greatest effects on voter turnout (2001: 299). Michael Martinez and
Jeff Gill highlight a particularly troubling trend in Canadian elections: the decline
in election turnout. They show that between 1979 and 1998 there was a systemic
decline in election turnout but fail to offer specific explanations for this trend (Martinez and Gill 2006). In contrast to the lack of academic studies regarding election
turnout in Canada, there has been notable work dealing with the general effects of
political corruption on election turnout.
Some research argues that political corruption will increase election turnout by
either galvanizing voters to “throw out the bums” or, inversely, to claim benefits
from rent-seeking politicians. Stockerner and Calca find that in Portugal, political corruption is positively correlated with election turnout. The authors find that
municipalities with high levels of corruption have election turnout several percentage points higher than municipalities with low levels of corruption. The authors
suggest that political corruption is a mobilizing agent, because news about corruption angers the public enough to incite them to vote (Stockerner and Calca 2013:
535). Gokhan Karahan, Morris Coats, and William Shughart also find that political
corruption increases election turnout, although their explanation of the causal relationship is much more cynical. Karahan, Coats, and Shughart suggest that corrupt
politicians are willing to distribute the gains of holding office to voters in return for
votes. Therefore, as corrupt politicians gain greater power, they are willing and able
to buy more votes. The authors substantiate these claims with a finding in Mississippi’s 1987 county supervisor elections (which took place after an FBI investigation
resulted in the conviction of 55 of 410 county supervisors). They determined that
Mississippians voted more in corrupt than non-corrupt counties (Karahan, Coats,
and Shughart 2006: 87).
Conversely, some academics also argue that political corruption will decrease
voter turnout. Using a broad sample of democratic countries, Daniel Stockerner,
Bernadette LaMontagne, and Lyle Scruggs find that political corruption is inversely
correlated with election turnout (2012: 74). In a study of Mexican voting, James
McCann and Jorge Dominguez found that widespread suspicions of fraud and
corruption made it less likely that opposition supporters voted, thus depressing
election turnout (1998: 483). It is clear that political corruption is related to voter
participation, though the nature of this relationship remains controversial.

Sponsorship Scandal

Following the 1995 Referendum on Quebec sovereignty, the governing Liberal
Party established a fund to raise Canada’s profile in Quebec. Revelations of corrup108
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tion involving this fund later became known as the “federal sponsorship scandal.”
The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation reports that the sponsorship scandal all
started with “rumours and whispers about the fund” (CBC 2006). Although the fund
was distributing federal money in Quebec, there were no application forms, and it was
unclear how the money was being used. In 2000, initial indications of government
corruption came to light as Public Works Minister Alfonso Gagliano faced public
criticism for awarding contracts to a company which hired his son as an executive.
Two years later, newly appointed Public Works Minister Don Boudria came under
fire for failing to find a report on cultural and sporting activities for which the government had paid $550,000. In time, the report was found. However, the Globe and Mail
asserted that this report was nearly identical to another report produced by a firm
which received $575,000 in government payment. Eventually, public pressure forced
Prime Minister Chretien to ask the auditor general of Canada to investigate.
Auditor General Sheila Fraser released reports in 2002 and 2004 that were highly
critical of the government, and the government responded by forming a Commission
of Inquiry in the lead up to the 2004 election. In 2002, Fraser released a preliminary
report accusing the government of breaking “just about every rule in the book.” Fraser then proceeded to ask the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to investigate
Groupaction, a firm that had been heavily involved with the sponsorship fund. The
RCMP raided Groupaction and began to investigate the Public Works Department. In
2004, Fraser released her second report on the sponsorship fund. This report implicated several senior government officials; Fraser discovered that government officials
had shown blatant disregard for rules and had mismanaged millions of dollars in
advertising and sponsorship money. The report detailed how the government had
paid hundreds of thousands of dollars, through contracts that were never officially
assigned, to firms that were not required to do any work. According to the report, the
corruption was “such a blatant misuse of funds that it is shocking” (CBC 2004).
Under public pressure, and having already contemplated it, Prime Minister Jean
Chretien retired from public office. Chretien’s successor, Paul Martin, promptly fired
the former public works minister, Gagliano, from his ambassadorship post. Martin
also suspended the heads of three Crown corporations and vowed to resign if any
evidence surfaced which linked him personally to the scandal. Perhaps the most
significant action Martin took was to ask Justice John Gomery to head an official
Commission of Inquiry into the sponsorship program (CBC 2006). The Gomery Commission, as it came to be known, did not begin hearing testimony until after a scheduled federal election in June 2004, which the Liberal Party only narrowly survived
(CBC 2008).
The Liberal Party retained a minority government in 2004, although the Gomery Commission’s report triggered another election in 2006. Prior to the sponsorship
scandal, the Liberal Party was heavily favored, with many expecting the Liberal Party
would retain its majority. But the Liberal Party dropped heavily in the polls in the
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lead-up to the election. On Election Day 28 June 2004, the Liberal Party managed to
win only enough seats to form a minority government, the first in twenty-five years
(CBC 2008). The Liberal Party respite was short-lived; in February 2005, the Gomery Commission issued hundreds of subpoenas and heard testimony throughout
the year (CBC 2008). On 1 November 2005, the commission released its first report,
absolving Jean Chretien and Paul Martin of personal wrongdoing. However, the
report stated that the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) did bear some responsibility,
because the PMO was responsible for running the sponsorship program. Regardless,
the opposition parties demanded that the government resign and call a new election
(CBC 2006). Initially, Martin refused to resign, but after the Liberal Party lost the support of the NDP (New Democratic Party of Canada), the opposition parties joined
together in a vote of non-confidence in late November 2005. This triggered the election held in 2006 (CBC 2008).
The 2006 federal election, held on 23 January, was a disaster for the Liberal Party.
The Liberals managed to win only 103 seats in Parliament while the Conservatives
won 124 seats. For the first time in twelve years, the Liberals were unable to win
enough seats to form the government, and the Conservatives formed a minority government. This election was followed by the release of the second part of the Gomery
Commission’s report. The report included a series of recommendations for reforms
to increase transparency and accountability in government (O’Neal and Smith 2006).

Methodology

To test the hypothesis that political scandals increase voter turnout, the effect of
the sponsorship scandal on voter turnout in the 2004 and 2006 Canadian federal elections is studied. Although a quantitative test on the effect of the sponsorship scandal
in subsequent Canadian elections would be preferable, a quantitative test that examined elections generally would have too few observations to have statistical significance. Therefore, this article first looks at general trends in voter turnout in Canada
across a series of elections from 1984 to 2011. This information is then complemented
by a quantitative analysis of voter turnout, using survey data from the 2004 and 2006
iterations of the Canadian Election Study (Fournier, Cutler, Soroka, and Stolle 2011).
Using this dataset, the effect of the sponsorship scandal on individual voting behavior in both the 2004 and 2006 election is tested, followed by a test of key components
in the causal relationship between the variables.
Variables
To determine general trends in voter turnout, data from Elections Canada is
used. This source is run by the Canadian federal government and includes official turnout for every election since 1867. This analysis focuses on the most recent
trends, so only elections from 1984 to 2011 are examined. It should be noted that the
1992 election was the referendum on Quebec sovereignty. Results from Quebec are
not included for that year, as Quebec held its own referendum. Furthermore, elec110
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tion turnout from the 1993 and 2000 elections were adjusted after the election following maintenance on the National Register of Electors that removed duplicates
(caused by electors moving) and electors who were deceased (Elections Canada
2013). These updated numbers are used, as they are the numbers officially used by
the Canadian government.
To determine the effect of the sponsorship scandal on individual voting behavior during the 2004 and 2006 federal elections, data is taken from the Canadian
Election Study that was run during both years. These two Canadian election surveys are cross-sectional surveys, meaning new respondents were selected for both
years. However, about half of the 2006 survey sample also participated in the 2004
Canadian Election Survey. Respondents to the survey were interviewed exclusively
by phone. The respondents were selected randomly from a directory of phone numbers generated by the Canadian Election Survey to represent all possible phone
numbers in Canada. Once a household was identified, the interviewer asked for
the number of adults in the household. If there was more than one adult in the
household, the adult with the closest birthday was selected. As the Canadian Election Survey is intended to represent all eligible Canadian voters, only Canadian
citizens eighteen years of age or older were eligible to participate in the survey. Furthermore, the sample was weighted by household size and province to ensure the
results were representative of the population of Canada (Fournier, Cutler, Soroka,
and Stolle 2011).
The Canadian Election Study had three components: a Campaign-Period Survey
(CPS), a Post-Election Survey (PES), and a Mail-Back Survey (MBS). The 2004 election
survey consisted of all three of these portions; however, the 2006 Canadian Election Study consisted of only the first two components, meaning that the MBS portion
of the survey was excluded. The CPS was conducted during the official campaign
period of the election. In the 2004 election, the campaign period lasted the thirty-six
days leading up to 28 June 2004. In the 2006 election, the campaign period was 30
November 2005, until the election on 22 January 2006 (a period of fifty-four days).
The PES survey started a week after the 2004 election and a day after the 2006 election. The MBS survey commenced one week after the PES survey had started, and
responses were accepted until the end of November of that year. Responses to each
of the portions of the survey vary, with the CPS portion of the survey receiving the
highest response rate. Below is a summary of the number of completed interviews for
each portion of the survey:
CPS

PES

MBS

2004

4,323

3,138

1,674

2006

4,058

1,684

___
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From the Canadian Election Study Documentation
To determine individual voting behavior during the 2004 and 2006 federal elections, questions from the CPS portion of the Canadian Election Survey are the primary source, but some responses are drawn from the PES and MBS portions of the
Canadian Election Survey. In the following sections, the dependent, independent,
and control variables are described. These are the variables used to test the general
hypothesis that the sponsorship scandal mobilized voters during the 2004 and 2006
election. Following this section, the method for testing the causal relationship (as
described in the hypothesis) is also outlined.
Dependent Variable
For both the 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Survey, respondents were asked
in English or French the question, “Did YOU vote in the election?” Respondents
were given the option of answering “yes,” “no,” or “do not know” (Fournier, Cutler,
Soroka, and Stolle 2011). Out of all of the respondents to the PES surveys for both
years, only five people refused to answer. It is possible that some respondents lied
about voting in the election or forgot if they had voted or not.
Independent Variables
Data is taken from the 2004 and 2006 iterations of the Canadian Election Survey
to measure attitudes toward the sponsorship scandal. During the campaign period
(in the CPS portion of the survey), the Canadian Election Survey asked respondents
the question “Does [the sponsorship scandal] make you very angry, somewhat angry,
not very angry, or not angry at all?” These responses were recoded in ascending order
so that “not angry at all” was coded as a 0, and “very angry” was coded as a 3. The
interviewer also coded for respondents that did not know anything about the scandal
or did not know how they felt about the scandal. Those respondents were omitted in
this analysis (Fournier, Cutler, Soroka, and Stolle 2011). Ideally, respondents that did
not know about the scandal would be coded as being “not angry at all.” However,
since those respondents could not be separated from people that responded by saying
they did not know how they felt about the scandal, it was necessary to omit them.
Across both surveys, a total of 458 respondents were omitted.
Control Variables
Attempts are made to control for other factors that could explain variation in voting behavior. Control variables for demographics include age, gender, and education.
The Canadian Election Study data includes the year of birth. This allows the age of
each of the respondents at the time of the 2004 and 2006 federal elections to be easily
calculated. The Canadian Election Study data also included the gender of the respondent. Education was controlled for using the question “What is the highest level of
education that you have completed?” This question was asked during the CPS survey, so all of the respondents to both the 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Study
survey were asked. There were eleven possible answers to this question. No school112
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ing through completed elementary school was coded as 1–3, some secondary/high
school through completed high school was coded as 4–5, some technical education,
community college, CEGEP, or college classique through a professional or doctoral
degree was coded as 6–11 (Fournier, Cutler, Soroka, and Stolle 2011). All respondents
who refused to respond to this question or who answered “do not know” were omitted.
Region and partisanship were also controlled, using data from the Canadian
Election Study. Respondents were coded for region depending on the Canadian province in which they resided. Respondents were also asked how they felt about each of
the major political parties in Canada. This question was asked during the CPS survey.
Interviewers were instructed to emphasize that the question was about the respective
federal parties as opposed to the provincial or local version of the party. The question
used in this analysis was about the federal Liberal Party and looked like this: “How
do you feel about the FEDERAL Liberal party.” Interviewers were then instructed
to ask the respondents to rate the federal Liberal Party on a 100 point scale, with a 0
being coded as “really dislike” and a 100 being coded as “really like.” Respondents
that refused to answer or answered that they did not know any of the parties were
coded as 50.
To test the causal relationship between the sponsorship scandal and voter turnout, data was taken from the MBS portion of the Canadian Election Study. Unfortunately, the MBS survey was not conducted during the 2006 election. As such, the
causal relationship described in the hypothesis can be tested only for the 2004 election. It is hypothesized that that the sponsorship scandal angered voters who then
became increasingly politically active. These galvanized voters then voted in greater
numbers in an effort to “throw out the bums.” To test this hypothesis, the relationship
between the sponsorship scandal and political activity and the relationship between
political activity and voting are both examined. Political activity is operationalized
by using the question, “During the most recent election how often did you talk to
other people to persuade them to vote for a particular party or candidate?” Respondents were given four possible answers: “Frequently,” “Occasionally,” “Rarely,” and
“Never.” These responses were recoded in ascending order with “Never” coded as a
“0” and “Frequently” coded as a “3.” This question was also used to test the relationship between political activity and voting, with voting being measured as previously
discussed (Fournier, Cutler, Soroka, and Stolle 2011).

Test Results

Canadian election turnout from 1984 to 2011 was used to look at general trends
in election turnout surrounding the 2004 and 2006 federal elections. Then a series of
statistical tests were run to determine the effect of the sponsorship scandal on individual voting behavior during those respective elections.
The general trends in election turnout suggest that the sponsorship scandal
played a role in increasing election turnout. Graph 1a demonstrates that from 1984
to 2004, election turnout was steadily declining. Martinez and Gill also noticed
113
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this decline in election turnout, although they failed to offer an explanation for this
decline (2006). Interestingly, the 2006 election saw a major spike in election turnout.
This is especially significant given that the increase in election turnout was counter
to an eighteen-year trend of declining election turnout. This spike in election turnout
may be attributable to the sponsorship scandal, as the 2006 election was triggered by
the opposition, using the sponsorship scandal as justification. Graph 2a illustrates
this spike in election turnout. Perhaps election turnout in 2004 was not as heavily
influenced by the sponsorship scandal as the official Gomery Commission report had
not yet been published. In fact, voters waiting for the official inquiry into the sponsorship scandal to conclude before drawing conclusions would not have been ready
to punish politicians at the polls until the 2006 election, as the official investigation
concluded between the two elections in 2005.
The analysis of individual voting behavior suggests the sponsorship scandal
caused election turnout to increase in the 2004 election. During the 2004 general election, voters’ attitudes about the sponsorship scandal had a statistically significant
effect on election turnout, as illustrated in Table 1a. A one-unit increase in how angry
voters felt about the sponsorship scandal (for example, going from “not angry at
all”to “not very angry” or from “somewhat angry” to “very angry”) increased the
Graph 1a: Canadian Federal Election Turnout 1984–2011

Graph 2a: Canadian Federal Eection Turnout 1997–2001
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Table 1a: 2004 Canadian Election Survey
(1)

(2)

Sponsorship Scandal

-0.0239***
(0.002)

0.015***
(0.005)

Gender(Male)

__

0.005
(0.013)

Age

__

0.003***
(0.000)

Education

__

0.017***
(0.003)

British Columbia

__

___

Alberta

__

0.015
(0.027)

Saskatchewan

__

0.017
(0.032)

Manitoba

__

-0.016
(0.033)

Ontario

__

0.018
(0.021)

Quebec

__

-0.019
(0.022)

New Brunswick

__

0.001
(0.041)

Nova Scotia

__

0.033
(0.044)

PEI

__

-0.024
(0.040)

Newfoundland

__

-0.088**
0.038

Political Affiliation

__

0.000
(0.000)

N

3004

1904

Pseudo

0.033

0.114

Regressor:

Regression summary statistics:

Note: The dependent variable is whether the respondent voted or not. Vote is coded with a 0 for
“did not vote” and a 1 for “voted.” The results are reported at the 90 percent*, 95 percent** and
99 percent*** significance levels. This is a normal linear regression.

probability of voting by 1.5 percent. Although this effect is small in absolute numbers,
compared to other statistically significant factors that affect voting, the sponsorship
115

KUTNEY
Table 1b: 2006 Canadian Election Survey
(1)

(2)

Sponsorship Scandal

0.022***
(0.005)

0.016***
(0.005)

Gender(Male)

__

0.015
(0.012)

Age

__

0.002***
(0.000)

Education

__

0.000
(0.000)

British Columbia

__

___

Alberta

__

-0.020
(0.027)

Saskatchewan

__

-0.005
(0.035)

Manitoba

__

-0.062**
(0.030)

Ontario

__

-0.018
(0.021)

Quebec

__

-0.029
(0.022)

New Brunswick

__

0.031
(0.050)

Nova Scotia

__

-0.043
(0.035)

PEI

__

-0.042
(0.038)

Newfoundland

__

-0.080**
0.036

Political Affiliation

__

0.000
(0.000)

N

1673

1639

Pseudo

0.017

0.095

Regressor:

Regression summary statistics:

Note: The dependent variable is whether the respondent voted or not. Vote is coded with a 0 for
“did not vote” and a 1 for “voted.” The results are reported at the 90 percent*, 95 percent** and
99 percent*** significance levels. This is a normal linear regression.

scandal has reasonably strong substantive significance. An increase in education, for
instance, only increases the probability of voting by 1.7 percent. Likewise, a decade
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in age only increases the probability of voting by 3 percent. Accordingly, it seems
that attitudes toward the sponsorship scandal were positively correlated with voting probability. These results support the hypothesis that the sponsorship scandal
mobilizes voters.
The analysis of individual voting behavior during the 2006 federal election also
suggests that the sponsorship scandal mobilized voters, leading to greater election
turnout. During the 2006 election, a one-unit increase in how angry voters felt about the
election increased the probability of voting by 1.6 percent. In comparison, a one decade
difference in age only increased the probability of voting by 2 percent. Interestingly,
in 2006, education did not have a statistically significant effect on voting. As shown in
Table 1b, these results suggest that the sponsorship scandal mobilized voters.
The test of the causal relationship suggests the sponsorship scandal did in fact
mobilize voters during the 2004 federal election in Canada. Table 2a contains the
results of a test of the relationship between attitudes about the sponsorship scandal
and political activity. The first test returned a statistically significant result that indicates a positive relationship between the sponsorship scandal and political activity,
meaning that the more angry voters were, the more politically active they became.
When run without control variables, the test indicated that a one-unit increase in anger
Table 2a: 2004 Canadian Election Survey
(1)

(2)

Sponsorship Scandal

1.175***
(0.026)

0.076**
(0.034)

Gender(Male)

__

0.163***
(0.051)

Age

__

0.005***
(0.001)

Education

__

0.063***
(0.012)

Province

__

0.003**
(0.001)

Political Affiliation

__

0.003
(0.001)

1583

1583

0.000

0.032

Yes

Yes

Regressor:

Regression summary statistics:
N
Robust Standard Errors

Notes: Regression. The dependent variable is political activity coded in ascending order from
“never” politically active to “frequently” politically active. The results are reported at the 90
percent,* 95 percent, ** and 99 percent*** significance levels. This is a normal linear regression.
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about the sponsorship scandal is associated with a corresponding increase in political
activity. Adding control variables does not drop the result out of statistical significance, but does lower the substantive significance of the result—a one-unit increase in
anger is now associated with only a small increase in political activity. Regardless, the
results support the causal relationship hypothesis, indicating a positive relationship
between anger about the sponsorship scandal and political activity.
The relationship between political activity and voting behavior was tested next.
The results of this test are reported in Table 2b. These results indicate a statistically
significant positive relationship between political activity and voting. In fact, as political activity increases by one unit, the probability of voting increases by about 4.5
percent. A person that is very politically active is thus 18 percent more likely to vote
than someone who is not at all politically active. As both parts of the test of the causal
relationship gave statistically significant positive results, it is concluded that the tests
of the causal relationship support the hypothesis that the sponsorship scandal mobilized voters during the 2004 Canadian federal election.

Conclusion

Results of the statistical analysis indicate the sponsorship scandal mobilized voters, since anger about the sponsorship scandal is positively correlated with increased
voter turnout. The results confirm that political scandals in Canada have an overall
Table 2b: 2004 Canadian Election Survey
(1)

(2)

Political Activity

0.050***
(0.007)

0.045***
(0.007)

Gender(Male)

__

-0.013
(0.013)

Age

__

0.002***
(0.000)

Education

__

0.014***
(0.003)

Province

__

0.000
(0.000)

Political Affiliation

__

0.000***
(0.000)

N

1583

1583

Pseudo

0.055

0.122

Regressor:

Regression summary statistics:

Notes: Probit. The dependent variable is whether the respondent voted or not. Vote is coded
with a 0 for “did not vote” and a 1 for “voted.” The results are reported at the 90 percent,* 95
percent, ** and 99 percent*** significance levels. This is a probit model.
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positive effect on voter turnout. Common sense may dictate that political scandals
have a detrimental effect on democracy. Many Eastern European countries have
experienced endemic corruption and political scandals, which have lowered citizens’ expectations for democracy. Recently in Egypt, the inefficiencies and imperfections of politicians led to the reinstallation of a military dictatorship, a dictatorship
tolerated and even supported by Egyptian liberals. However, in a country such as
Canada, with a long history of democracy, scandals may have an overall positive
effect. According to the tests performed in this analysis, anger over the sponsorship
scandal contributed to the reversal of a decade-long trend of decreasing voter turnout. In effect, the sponsorship scandal served to reinvigorate the electorate. It may be
that a succession of serious political scandals could weaken and erode democracy.
But in a rich, Western country such as Canada, the occasional political scandal—such
as the ongoing Canadian Senate Expenses Scandal—may infuse much needed energy
into the system. Indeed, the Canadian Senate Expenses Scandal may be just what the
doctor ordered.
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